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CASENOTE
COUNTY IMMIUNITY-CouNTY NOT LIABLE FOR PERSONAL INJURIES
SUFFERED IN AN ACCIDENT CAUSED BY THE REmOVAL OF A STOP SIGN
FROM A HAZARDoUS INTERSETION-McKinney v. County of Cass, 180
Neb. 685, 144 N.W.2d 416 (1966).
The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle traveling north on
a graveled county road. The vehicle collided at an intersection
with a car traveling east on another graveled county road, which
had been designated an arterial. A stop sign which had protected
the east-west road had been removed about one week prior to the
accident by employees of the county, and no temporary stop signs
or warning signs had been substituted. The driver of the vehicle
in which plaintiff was riding was not familiar with the intersection
in question. The driver of the eastbound car was familiar with the
intersection, and knew that some stop signs in the area had been
removed for repainting and repair; but it was not conclusively
determined at the trial whether he knew that this particular stop
sign had been removed. (The jury determined that the defendant
driver was not negligent as to the notice of stop signs being removed
in the general area of the accident. He testified that he did not
know that the particular stop sign in question had been removed
for repainting and repair.)
The trial court dismissed the defendant county at the close of
plaintiff's evidence. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant
driver of the eastbound car. On appeal the Supreme Court of
Nebraska affirmed as to both defendants, holding that a county is
immune from liability for personal injuries which are caused by
an accident that results when the county removes a stop sign,
which protects an arterial road and a hazardous intersection, for
the purpose of repair and negligently fails to put a warning in
its place.
HISTORY OF COUNTY IMMUNITY
The rule of county immunity arose from the English case of
Russell v. Men of Devon.' This case was a tort action against one
hundred men of the community who had done a public service by
building a bridge. The court said it was "better that an individual
should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an
injustice."'2 It was better that the public service continue than
to hold it liable to an individual. Thus the rule is based on a prefer-
ence to use public funds for public service rather than private
indemnification. The rule was also based on necessity, that is, the
1 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
2 Id. at 362.
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county did not have enough money to carry out its functions and
also to satisfy personal judgments.3
The doctrine of county immunity has been established in
Nebraska by the case of Wehn v. Commissioners of Gage County,
4
which cites the Russell case.
COUNTIES AND MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
DISTINGUISHED
A county is a political subdivision and a creation of state gov-
ernment. It differs from a municipal corporation in that it is not
created by the request and consent of the residents thereof.5 A
distinction is generally recognized between the liability for negli-
gence of a municipal corporation and that of a county.6 In Ne-
braska the liability of a county for negligence is imposed by
statute.
7
At the common law a county was not obligated to keep its
roads in repair so as to make them reasonably safe for travel,
while a municipal corporation was, as the maintenance of roads
was considered a "proprietary" rather than a "governmental" func-
tion. Much of the discussion that follows deals with cases involving
municipal corporations, but the theories that deal with possible
municipal liability for the negligent maintenance of stop signs are
suitable for application to county liability.8
NEBRASKA STATUTES APPLIED
Two Nebraska statutes had to be construed in McKinney v.
County of Cass, NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-834 (Reissue 1960), 9 and NEB.
3 Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
4 5 Neb. 494, 25 Am. Rep. 497 (1887).
5 Woods v. Colfax County, 10 Neb. 552, 7 N.W. 269 (1880).
6 The case of Stitzel v. Hitchcock County, 139 Neb. 700, 298 N.W. 555
(1941), says that the liability of a municipal corporation depends on
whether the damages arose from a governmental or a proprietary
function. These two functions are the two classes of municipal power.
Under the former the municipality acts as a sovereign and governs
its inhabitants. Under the latter the municipality acts for its own
private advantage. These functions or powers are separate and dis-
tinct. The municipality is not liable for the negligent performance of
a governmental function, but can be held for the negligent perform-
ance of a discretionary or proprietary function. Hamler v. City of
Jacksonville, 97 Fla. 807, 122 So. 220 (1929).
7 Stitzel v. Hitchcock County, 139 Neb. 700, 298 N.W. 555 (1941).
8 Berglund v. Spokane County, 4 Wash.2d 309, 103 P.2d 355 (1940).
9 Defective bridge or highway; damages; when county liable; limita-
tion. If special damage happens to any person, his team, carriage or
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REV. STAT. § 39-729 (Reissue 1960). 10 The former statute waives
county immunity when personal injuries occur as a result of the
"insufficiency or want of repair of a highway." The latter gives the
county the power to erect and maintain stop signs where "it is
deemed advisable."
In the principle case the County of Cass erected a stop sign,
then removed it for repainting and repair and put no other warn-
ing in its place. This latter action would seem to indicate that
the county violated the direction of NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-729 (Reissue
1960), in that, by removing the stop sign and putting no warning
in its place the county failed to "maintain" the stop sign. The
word "maintain" is practically the same thing as "repair," which
means to restore to a sound or good state, after decay, injury,
dilapidation, or partial destruction, and, when used in reference
to railroad right of way, includes the idea of keeping the right of
way in such a condition that it can be used for the purpose for
which it was intended."' It could be argued that the County of Cass,
by removing the sign, did not "maintain" the sign for the purpose
for which it was intended, that is, to protect an arterial road and
warn the traveler of a dangerous intersection; although it could also
be argued that "maintain" means simply to keep the sign in repair
so that it is readable. NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-729 (Reissue 1960), does
not impose a duty on the county to erect stop signs, but the language
of the statute can be construed by the court to mean that once a stop
sign has been erected there is a duty to maintain it in such a way
that so long as there is a dangerous intersection there will be a
warning sign to protect it.
In Olson v. Wayne County, the syllabus states:
other property by means of insufficiency or want of repair of a high-
way or bridge, which the county or counties are liable to keep in
repair, the persons sustaining the damage may recover in an action
against the county....
10 "Flares, stop signs, traffic signals, warning signs; designing, manu-
facture and installation; powers of Department of Roads, county
boards; costs, when paid by railroads; right of way.
In order to further promote safety, power is conferred upon the
Department of Roads to devise and supervise the manufacture and
erection of stop signs, red flares, traffic signals, traffic lights, or warn-
ing signs, and to erect and maintain such of them on state highways
and at railroad crossings where the same intersect highways, where,
in the judgment of the department, it is deemed advisable. In order
to further promote safety, the power is conferred upon county boards
to purchase and erect stop signs or warning signs and to erect and
maintain such of them at all intersections on county highway systems,
where, in the judgment of the county boards, it is deemed advisable."
11 Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 107 S.W. 572 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908).
12 157 Neb. 213, 59 N.W.2d 400 (1953).
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A county is not obligated to erect and maintain safety warning
signs along its highways apprising the public of conditions such
as curves, turns, location of bridges, and similar situations that
may be hazardous, unless the duty to exercise reasonable and ordi-
nary care in the maintenance of its highways requires it to do so at
a particular location.'8
It has been stated in construing NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-834 (Reis-
sue 1960), that,
A county is obligated to use reasonable and ordinary care in
the construction, maintenance, and repair of its highways and
bridges so that they will be reasonably safe for the traveler using
them while he is in the exercise of reasonable and ordinary cau-
tion and prudence.14
It is also stated that, "this important word 'insufficiency,' was used
in this section, may be defined as being inadequate to the need,
use, or purpose of the highway."'15
It can reasonably be said that an intersection with a road that
has been designated an arterial, and has for some time been
treated as an arterial by those who use it, is not "reasonably safe"
for even a cautious traveler when the stop signs protecting it are
abruptly taken down and alternative warning signs are not sub-
stituted. This was especially true in McKinney, where the stop
sign in question had been protecting a "blind" intersection.
These arguments for imposing a duty on the county to maintain
warning signs are supported by the fact that traffic accidents are
increasing at an alarming rate. The possibility of being held liable
for negligence would make the county more alert in carrying out
its governmental functions.
When these two statutes are construed together a strong case
can be made for holding the county liable. It would not be hard
to say that: (1) such stop signs should be considered part of the
highway since they are to be erected at intersections "on county
highway systems," (2) the county has a duty to maintain a stop
sign once it has been deemed advisable to erect it, and (3) a failure
to maintain said sign is an insufficient repair of the highway for
which the county is liable if personal injuries result therefrom.
Is Id. at 214, 59 N.W.2d at 402.
14 Olson v. Wayne County 157 Neb. 213, 219, 59 N.W.2d 400, 404 (1953).
Accord, Shields v. County of Buffalo, 161 Neb. 34, 71 N.W.2d 701
(1955); Wittwer v. County of Richardson, 153 Neb. 200, 43 N.W.2d
505 (1950); Dickenson v. County of Cheyenne, 146 Neb. 36, 18 N.W.2d
559 (1945).
15 Olson v. Wayne County, 157 Neb. 213, 219, 59 N.W.2d 400, 404 (1953).
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THE LAW OF JURISDICTIONS OTHER THAN NEBRASKA
Generally it was held at the common law that the maintenance
and repair of the streets so as to keep them reasonably safe for
travel is a corporate duty for which a municipal corporation was
liable for negligence. 16 A county on the other hand was under no
such common law duty, 7 but NEB. REv. STAT. § 39-834 (Reissue
1960), has placed a similar duty on counties. This leads to the dis-
tinction that has been made between the physical condition of
the roadway, and its use by the public. It is said that the keeping
of the street safe for travel relates to the physical condition of the
street and is a proprietary function for which there is liability,
while the use of that street by the public and the making and
enforcing of traffic regulations and warnings is a governmental
function for which there is no liability.' s There are many cases
that have held the government liable where the traffic control
actually became a physical obstruction in the roadway which
resulted in injury, as where a car actually hits a stop sign which
is in the middle of the road.' 9 In those cases the liability was based
on the fact that there was a physical defect in the street rendering
it unsafe for travel. 20
The issue then arises as to whether a stop sign is part of the
street, that is a physical appurtenance thereto. If the stop sign
becomes a physical appurtenance to the street then it becomes
part of the physical condition of the street for which there is a duty
to keep in reasonable repair. This theory has not been universally
accepted, in fact the majority of jurisdictions do not recognize it
and simply hold the government not liable on the basis that the
regulation of traffic is a governmental function.
On the other hand there have been a number of recent cases
that have adopted the theory.21 Michigan has enacted a sta-
tute22 that is very similar to NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-834 (Reissue 1960).
16 18 E. McQuillan, MUNIcniAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.41 (3d ed. rev. 1963)
17 40 C.J.S. Highways § 250 (1944).
18 Auslander v. City of St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W.2d 778 (1933);
Kirk v. City of Muskogee, 183 Okla. 536, 83 P.2d 594 (1938).
19 Auslander v. City of St. Louis, 332 Mo. 145. 56 S.W.2d 778 (1933);
Kirk v. City of Muskogee, 183 Okla. 536, 83P.2d 594 (1938).
20 Kirk v. City of Muskogee, 183 Okla. 536, 83P.2d 594 (1938).
21 See, e.g., Wagshal v. District of Columbia, 216 A.2d 172 (D.C. 1966).
22 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 9.591 (1958). This section has since been repealed
and replaced by MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.996(101)-(115) (1965), which
sets out a statutory scheme allowing recovery from a governmental
agency for failure to keep in repair the "improved portion of the
highway designed for vehicular travel." This new provision seems
to limit liability to defects in the road surface itself.
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The case of O'Hare v. City of Detroit23 has a factual situation very
similar to that of the principle case,24 and also construes the Michi-
gan statute. O'Hare states,
It seems obvious to us that once a municipality has decided to
exercise the discretion vested in it to declare one street a through
street and erect a stop sign facing the subordinate street, and the
stop sign becomes an important part of the physical appurtenance
of the street.25
The results in O'Hare and McKinney are directly opposed to
each other. In each case the plaintiff was a passenger whose driver
was traveling on a stop street on which the stop sign was not in
place. Yet, the Michigan court felt that once a stop sign was
erected, it became a physical appurtenance of the street, as opposed
to the Nebraska court which felt that the statutory liability ex-
tended no farther than the traveled surface of the roadbed. The
reasoning which led to the O'Hare result was based on safety and
the fitness of the street for travel. The reasoning leading to the
McKinney result seems to be a desire not to change the common
law rule of non-liability, and to strictly construe NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 39-834 (Reissue 1960). The O'Hare case was cited to the Nebraska
court on appeal, but the court was unwilling to adopt its reasoning.
One oft-cited case accepts the physical appurtenance theory
and finds the governmental unit liable without a statute.2 6 The
case reasons that once traffic control devices are erected they
become a mechanical appurtenance of the street, and states that
a mechanical structure can exercise no discretion as a policeman
is able to do. Since no discretion is involved, the "discretionary
function" distinction is removed and liability can be found. This
case bases its reasoning, as does O'Hare, on the theory that traffic
control devices have a pronounced effect on the safety of the
streets.
2 7
23 362 Mich. 19, 106 N.W.2d 538 (1960).
24 The plaintiff, a passenger, was traveling on what was ordinarily a
stop street, but the stop sign had been knocked down the day before
by a truck. Plaintiff's driver entered the unprotected intersection
and was struck by a bus. The plaintiff sustained personal injuries
and brought suit against the city. The city claimed governmental
immunity, but the Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court
and found for the plaintiff.
25 362 Mich. 19, 22, 106 N.W.2d 538, 540 (1960).
26 Johnston v. City of East Moline, 338 Ill. App. 220, 87 N.E.2d 22 (1949).
27 The factual situation in Johnston is more adapted for a determination
of governmental liability than are those of O'Hare and McKinney. In
Johnston a damaged signal light had been removed at an intersec-
tion, while the other signals remained in operation. The plaintiff
was invited into the intersection by a green light while the other
CASENOTE
The safety of the traveler depends on the warnings that he
will receive apprising him of the fact that a dangerous condition
lurks ahead.
Under the law, traffic approaching an arterial from an intersect-
ing street must yield the right of way, regardless of the general
rule. This exception to the law giving the driver on the right
preference becomes an absolute menace unless drivers approach-
ing an arterial are warned of the fact .... Plaintiff here was not
familiar with the physical situation, and, in the absence of the
usual warnings and stop signs, had no notice of the fact that he
was approaching an intersecting arterial highway where he was
required to yield the right of way to traffic approaching from
either direction. 28
There is little doubt that the average traveler relies on warn-
ing signs to protect himself from dangerous situations in the
course of his travel,29 thus it seems that for a highway to be reason-
ably safe for its travelers, warning signs must be maintained where
they are necessary. If this reasoning would be followed, the govern-
mental unit would be liable under the factual situation found in
the principle case.
A discussion of the negligent failure to maintain a stop sign
would not be complete without mentioning the possibility of recov-
ery on the basis of nuisance, that is, when a stop sign is removed,
it is no longer serving the purpose for which it was erected. There-
fore drivers are lured into the unprotected intersection. Generally
it is held that there is no actionable nuisance created when the
government fails to properly maintain a traffic control device3 0
Such decisions say that this maintenance of traffic controls is a
governmental function, so there is no liability,3 1 or that the govern-
ment is under no duty to maintain such controls, therefore a nuis-
ance cannot be created for failure to do so.
3 2
driver involved entered the intersection because the control which
would have signalled him to stop had been removed. The government
in Johnston created a trap which made it more likely for an accident
to occur. In O'Hare and McKinney the plaintiffs driver entered the
intersection relying on the absence of a dangerous condition on the
basis that no warning was afforded them, as opposed to Johnston
where the plaintiff relied on the invitation of a green light to enter
the intersection. This does not mean that the result in O'Hare is
wrong, but it is distinguishable in that O'Hare reasoned that a driver
should be warned of his approach to a designated arterial.
28 Lyle v. Fiorito, 187 Wash. 537, 544, 60 P.2d 709. 713 (1936).
29 Keep in mind that the law requires a driver to maintain a proper
lookout when driving.
30 Annot., 161 A.L.R. 1404 (1946).
31 Tolliver v. City of Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E.2d 357 (1945).
32 Kirk v. City of Muskogee, 183 Okla. 536, 83 P.2d 594 (1938).
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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The doctrine of county immunity is a court-made rule and
therefore it is within the proper authority of the court to overrule
the doctrine.83
In 1966 the Nebraska Supreme Court overruled the charitable
immunity doctrine in the case of Myers v. Drozda .3 4 The case is
significant because it shows an emphasis on compensation to injured
plaintiffs, and it establishes a Nebraska precedent for overruling
outmoded rules.
It is true in the principle case that the legislature has acted
to remove part of the court-made rule of county immunity. This
should not stop the court from removing governmental immunity
from tort liability where the legislature has not specifically done
so.85 The Nebraska court has deemed it advisable to remove one
area of tort liability from immunity; so it would seem plausible
that it should remove another area of immunity, that is, in the area
of county immunity for the insufficient maintenance of warning
signs and traffic controls.
The court in McKinney said, "The duty of the county will not
be extended by construction beyond the words and fair implication
of the statutory liability."3 6 The Nebraska Supreme Court did not
see fit to extend the statute to include stop signs within the fair
33 Government immunity has been judicially abolished in whole or in
part in:
California-Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211, 359
P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
Colorado-Colorado Racing Com'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 136 Colo.
279, 316 P.2d 582 (1957).
Florida-Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1957).
Illinois-Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18
I1L2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959).
Minnesota-Spanel v. Mounds View School District, 264 Minn. 279,
118 N.W.2d 795 (1962).
Michigan-Williams v. City of Detroit, 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d 1
(1961).
New Jersey-McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820
(1960).
Wisconsin--Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis.2d 26, 115 N.W.2d
618 (1962).
But see Urow v. District of Columbia, 316 F.2d 351 (1963), citing 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1962), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1965); Act July 14, 1960,
74 Stat. 519.
34 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966).
35 Muscopf v. Corning Hospital District, 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
36 McKinney v. County of Cass, 180 Neb. 685, 689, 144 N.W.2d 416, 420
(1966).
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implication of the statute. The result reached coincides with the
greater weight of authority which holds that a stop sign is not
part of the road and that there is only a duty to keep the surface
of the road free of physical defects.
Since the Nebraska court has chosen not to extend the concept
of governmental tort liability to the negligent removal of stop signs,
the burden falls upon the legislature. New York is an example
of a state where outright destruction of immunity was accomplished
by statute. 7 But perhaps a more reasonable approach was taken
by California.38 There a public entity is to be found liable for
injury caused by a "dangerous condition of its property." The
dangerous condition must be caused by a negligent act of the gov-
ernment's agent, or one that continues after the government has
received notice of the condition and has had a reasonable time to
remedy it. A later enactment provides that there is to be no govern-
mental liability for an injury resulting from a plan or design which
had been approved by a reasonable legislative body, or that which
would have been approved by a reasonable legislative body if no
such plan was actually adopted. 9 The question of reasonableness is
to be determined by the court.
The California courts have yet to rule on a situation similar
to McKinney, but they have held that a dangerous condition for
which there is liability is created by the faulty arrangement of traffic
lights.40 It would be logical to assume that an application of the
California enactments to the McKinney facts would result in county
liability. It would be reasonable to argue that: (1) A dangerous
condition is created by the acts of the county since it is reasonable
for travelers to rely on signs to warn them of their approach to
hazardous intersections and arterial roads; and (2) The removal
of stop signs for repair without providing adequate warnings would
not be contemplated by legislative plan and is not conduct reason-
able in itself.
CONCLUSION
The doctrine of governmental immunity dates back many years.
There is a definite trend to partially or completely abrogate the
doctrine because the reasons for the rule are outdated. There is
no longer any necessity for the individual plaintiff to bear the loss
37 N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8 (McKinney 1963). See also Richardson v. State,
28 Misc.2d 607, 218 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1961).
38 CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 830(a) and CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 835 (West 1966).
39 CAL. GOV'T. CODE § 830.6 (West 1966).
40 Teall v. City of Cudahy, 60 Cal.2d 431, 386 P.2d 493, 34 Cal. Rptr. 869
(1963).
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since the government can spread the loss among the taxpayers
and insurance is readily available. Our plaintiff-oriented society
also prefers compensating an injured person as opposed to using
the funds for public service.
The argument for placing a duty on the government to erect
and maintain stop signs at hazardous intersections is more forceful
because of the alarming increase in automobile accidents. Drivers
rely on warning signs, and if they are not maintained in places
where a dangerous condition exists then the responsible govern-
mental body should be liable for any resulting damage or injury.
Thomas B. Thomsen '68
